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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
It is submitted that such a result, although not violative of
CPLR 3110's express wording, does violate its spirit. It remains
to be seen whether the second department will qualify the holding
in Ambrose (as might easily be done since the opinion does not
expressly say that the objection was not supported by facts
tending to establish real prejudice). But, presently, the law
in the second department is that a mere preemptory objection
will suffice.
ARTICLE 32- ACcELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3211(a)(8).: Motion challenging jurisdiction granted after
service of answer.
Brodsky v. Spencer44 previously discussed in this issue of
the Survey, dealt primarily with the sufficiency of notice under a
court ordered service. However, the interesting problem of raising
a defense in a timely manner was also presented. The court allowed
a motion challenging jurisdiction although it was not made in
the interval "before service of the responsive pleading is required."
The legislature, though attempting to prevent dilatory tactics
and yet achieve the economy afforded by preliminary hearings
aimed at avoiding trial, seemingly left no specific provision whereby
the defendant 5 could speed a determination of a jurisdictional
issue when it is raised in the answer.
While the court found no problem with the limitation, it
provided no rationale for its action. However, its holding can
be justified in two ways. First, a 3211 motion can be treated as
a 3212 motion for summary judgment. Under this provision the
lack of jurisdiction could have been determined at any time
prior to trial and was thus timely.8 6 Second, justification can be
drawn from 3211 itself. The defendant properly raised the
defense in his answer, so as not to waive it under 3211, but then
moved for an early adjudication of his claim. This specific pro-
cedure is not provided for by 3211. However, the section stresses
the correct procedure so as not to waive the defense-raising the
defense in the answer as the defendant did. Seemingly, then, it
does not torture the section to allow a determination of the
defense by motion. 7 Such an interpretation would hurt neither
the plaintiff nor defendant and would help clear the court's
calendar.
84 52 Misc. 2d 4, 277 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1966).
85The plaintiff can, by 3211(b), make a motion to dismiss a defense.
86 7B McKiNNEn's CPLR 3211, supp. commentary 140 (1967).
8 7Ibid.
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It 8eems, however, that the soundest procedure would be to
rely upon a direct 3212 motion in such situations until the
legislature provides a specific provision by which the defendant
can speed the determination of 3211 defenses.
CPLR 3211(e).: Jurisdictional defense raised in amended answer
relates back to time of original answer.
In Blatz v. Benschine,88 defendant raised the defense of lack
of personal jurisdiction,8 9 not in his original answer, but in his
responsive pleadings to plaintiff's amended complaint. The Supreme
Court, Queens County, ruled that the defense interposed was
timely.90 The court reasoned: since plaintiff decided to serve,
as a matter of right, an amended complaint, defendant was forced
to respond, also as a matter of course, with amended pleadings
which contained the CPLR 3211 (a) (8) defense. The amendment
was deemed to relate back to the time of service of the original
answer, therefore, defendant's assertion of the jurisdictional defense
was timely.
It is significant to note that the court in the present case
allowed the interposition of the defense as a matter of right, and
not as a matter of its discretion. Thus, the plaintiff who elects
to amend his complaint may then be faced with a jurisdictional
defense.
CPLR 3213.: Summary judgment on conditional instrument denied.
CPLR 3213 provides that "[w]hen an action is based upon a
judgment or instrument for the payment of money only, the plaintiff
may serve with the summons a notice of motion for summary
judgment . . . in lieu of a complaint." The statute was con-
ceived in an effort to provide a speedy and effective means of
securing a judgment on claims presumptively meritorious where
a formal complaint would be superfluous and the resulting delay
needless. 1
In Baker v. Gundermann,9 2 the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment was based on two written instruments. The first failed
to come within the purview of the statute as an "instrument for
8 53 Misc. 2d 352, 278 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1967).
89 CPLR 3211(a) (8).
0053 Misc. 2d at 354, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 535. CPLR 3211(e) provides:
"An objection based upon a ground specified in paragraphs eight or nine
of subdivision (a) is waived if a party . .. does not raise 'such objection
in the responsive pleading."
.*91FIRsT REP. 91. See also 4 W.EINsT=N, KORN & MIu.T~a NEW YORx
Crmv PRAcricE f[3213.01 (1965).
9252 Misc. 2d 639, 276 N.Y.S2d 495 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
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